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1. lntroduction. A standard treatment of functional analysis ("functional-
ism") among philosophers of science has recently come under attack by a 
new variety of "functionalist" in the philosophy of psychology.l Jerry 
Fodor, the chief proponent of this new approach, challenges the view that 
functional statements can be eliminated in favor of causal (nomological) 
statements. He supports his position by providing the outlines of a functional 
analysis of mental concepts which he believes illuminates the mind-body 
problem. In particular, Fodor holds that his version of functionalism clarifies 
hoW a materialist may avoid adherence to the reductionist thesis that mental 
concepts can be eliminated in favor of physical concepts. 2 
F odor's criticism of the "standard view" of functional analysis is 
blunted, however, in two ways. (a) The parallel between the standard 
treatment and Fodor's variant breaks down in a crucial manner. Consequent-
ly, even if he establishes that functional statements as he construes them 
cannot be eliminated in favor of causal statements, he has not yet shown that 
functional statements as construed by the standard view are ineliminable. (b) 
Many of the virtues of Fodor's account, particularly as it avoids reductionist 
solutions to the mind-body problem, can be obtained without recourse to the 
troublesome concept of a function. 
2. Fodor's Account. According to Fodor, a complete explanation in 
psychology consists of two parts: a functional analysis and a mechanistic or 
casual analysis. 3 A phase one theory provides a functional characterization of 
"internal states" of an organism such as memories, motives, needs, drives, 
desires, strategies, beliefs, etc. solely in terms of the way in which they 
function in producing behavior. Such theories attribute only those properties 
and degree of complexity to internal states of an organism necessary to 
account for some part of its behavior and make no reference to 
neurophysiological conditions or structures.4 An example of such a phase one 
theory is the use of concepts like memory trace, long-term memory and 
short-term memory in order to account for human memory evincing 
behavior. 5 Such a theory does not provide a causal explanation, it is asserted, 
although it may provide the basis for predicting human behavior given 
sufficient knowledge about stimulus conditions. 6 
A phase two theory, on the other hand, may well provide a causal 
explanation for behavior by postulating a mechanism capable of producing 
this behavior. A neurological theory, for instance, may be developed which 
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introduces a physiological condition responsible for the memory capacities of 
human beings characterized by the memory hypothesis which is cast in 
functional/psychological concepts. Whether there is such a mechanism is itself 
an empirical question. 
The two types of theory are brought together by showing them to be 
"functionally equivalent," i.e. by establishing that the behavioral conse-
quences of the mechanism postulated by the phase two theory are the same 
in relevant respects as the behavior which characterizes psychological states in 
the phase one theory. 7 How this functional equivalence is to be demonstrated 
in any specific case is not clearly indicated, but Fodor is sure that there is no 
way of translating ''11 and <I> are functionally equivalent' into'll and <I> are 
each causal conditions for B" (where ''11' IS replaced by some functional/ 
psychological expression, '<I>' by some neurophysiological description and 'B' 
by some description of behavior).8 Such a conclusion follows directly from 
the claim that the connection between functionally characterized internal 
mental states and behavior is not causal. Both phases of the theory are 
necessary for an adequate psychology, and neither is eliminable. A functional 
analysis is, therefore, a necessary and ineliminable part of any respectable 
scientific explanation of human behavior. 
The consequences of Fodor's account for the theory of mind emerge 
when we consider the character and connection between phase one and phase 
two theories. He illustrates the relationship by pointing to the difference 
between describing a device as a valve-lifter and speaking of it as a camshaft. 9 
To say that something is a valve-lifter is to describe it in terms of its function, 
and for this reason it is inappropriate to ask "What does a valve-lifter consist 
of?" where this is a request for a specification on physical parts. The term 
'camshaft,' however, comes from our physical object vocabulary. Camshafts 
consist of rods, springs and atoms. It follows from similar considerations that 
no reductionist account of the mind-body relation is possible. As in the 
valve-lifter/camshaft example, psychological (Le. functional) states are not 
susceptible to reduction in the sense of microanalysis in terms of physical 
components. 
Furthermore, just as there may be different kinds of physical objects 
which provide a mechanism for lifting valves, so too there may be different 
mechanisms functionally equivalent to some psychological state described by 
a phase one theory. It may even be the case that certain psychological states 
can be realized both by neurophysiological and electronic mechanisms. 
Hence, even if a certain neurophysiological mechanism is found to be 
functionally equivalent to a psychological state or process, no reduction is 
available, as it would remain possible that some other neurological or 
electronic mechanism could equally well realize it. 
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3. The "standard view. " Although philosophers of science have sometimes 
cited functional analyses in psychology (e.g. by mentioning that Freudian 
psychology treats symptom formation as functioning to avoid anxiety), 
proponents of the standard view more usually focus on the methods 
promoted by sociologists such as Merton or anthropologists such as 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, who utilize functional analysis in strictly 
social contexts. 1 0 
Characteristically, these functional analyses are seen as attempting to 
provide explanations for certain social or cultural items in terms of the role 
(function) they have in satisfying certain basic needs (functional prerequisi-
tes) necessary for the survival or viability of a social group. The functional 
analyses proffered by social scientists are measured against the requirements 
for explanation inheren t in the covering law model. According to this model 
statements describing items to be explained must follow deductively from a 
set of premises which include general empirical laws as well as statements of 
particular facts. 1 1 In order to fulfill these requirements it is necessary to 
reconstruct functional analyses by replacing functional statements with causal 
(nomological) statements. For example, Radcliffe-Brown's suggestion that 
totemic rites among certain Australian tribes have the social function of 
supporting a body of cosmological ideas which enable the tribe to survive is 
recast as asserting that totemic rites are traits causally sufficient for 
maintaining states necessary to the continued survival of the tribe. 1 2 
Examination of such reconstructions, however, often leads to the 
conclusion that the functional analysis given provides an inadequate 
explanation. The social account may fail the deductivity requirement because 
the item to be explained (in the example above, totemic rites) is only one 
among a number of possible ways in which a social need can be satisfied (i.e. 
one among a number of functionally equivalent items). Alternatively, it may 
be unacceptable because claims about the needs (functional prerequisites) of 
the social group in question cannot be reformulated as general empirical laws. 
For these reasons, the standard view holds that functional analyses of social 
phenomena have usually not been scientifically respectable (meaning in part 
that they do not satisfy the requirements of the covering law model of 
scientific explanation). Rather, they are thought to have at best a heuristic 
role in directing inquiry to possible self-regulative aspects of social systems. 1 3 
Furthermore, success in eliminating functional statements in biology in 
favor of statements about homeostatically controlled systems are held by the 
proponents of the standard view to offer hope that functional analyses in the 
social sciences can be rendered scientifically respectable by reconstructions 
Which locate social items within a causal analysis of the social group as a 
self-regulating system. 
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4. Criticism. (a) Fodor's account of functional analysis and that offered by 
the standard view appear to clash over the issue of whether functional 
statements can be eliminated in favor of causal statements, and further 
whether they can be "scientifically respectable" even if they cannot be 
eliminated. This conflict dissipates, however, if we note crucial differences 
between the kinds of analyses which are considered functional. 
For the standard view functional analyses in psychology are typically 
found when an attempt is made to account for some recurrent piece Or 
pattern of behavior (e.g. hysterical paralysis) by pointing out its function in 
the larger system of a person's psychological states (e.g. how it relieves 
unconscious anxiety about being drafted).14 In contrast, Fodor is concerned 
with a functional analysis not of behavior itself, but rather of the 
psychological states lying behind behavior. 
F or the standard view a functional analysis purports to provide a 
"functional explanation" of an item which can be identified and individuated 
in a relatively unproblematic way (i.e. an item which is "observable") such as 
totemic rites or hysterical paralysis. Fodor, however, construes a functional 
analysis as what might more appropriately be called a "functional descrip-
tion." The objects of functional analysis for him are theoretical constructs 
which are described in terms of their behavioral (i.e. observable) manifesta-
tions, though they are not themselves directly observable. He is not 
concerned with explaining these psychological states. 
The standard view demands reconstruction of functional statements by 
means of causal (nomological) statements precisely because they purport to 
provide explanations. Proponents are not committed to the view that the 
different kind of statements indicating the relation between terms in a theory 
and its evidential or observational base must be eliminated in favor of causal 
statements. Indeed, they take pains to point out that many of the theoretical 
terms used by social scientists are faulty because they have not been 
adequately related to observational or operational concepts. Fodor appears to 
be talking about "functional analysis" in a way in which other philosophers 
of science talk about "correspondence rules," "coordinative definitions," 
"partial definitions" or "bridge principles." 1 5 Construed in this way, there is 
no substantive conflict between Fodor's account of functional analysis and 
that offered by the standard view. Proponents of the standard view are willing 
to acknowledge the importance of operationalizing psychological concepts in 
terms of behavior, admit that statements providing this connection cannot be 
eliminated in favor of causal statements and agree that such statements are a 
necessary part of any respectable scientific theory. Such admissions, however, 
leave untouched their claim that functional explanations need to be recast in 
causal language. 
(b) The advantages provided by Fodor's use of the concept of functional 
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analysis do not spring from their analogy with other uses of the confusing 
concept of a function. The important difference between describing 
something as a valve-lifter and describing it as a camshaft, need not be 
construed as obtaining because the first is a description in terms of function 
and the second is not. It is, after all, not obvious that the relationship 
between being a valve-lifter and valve-lifting behavior is similar to that 
between long-term memory and the behavior which manifests it. What is 
important in such an example is not the specific difference between a 
functional description and a non-functional description, but the fact that we 
have two different and conceptually distinct alternative descriptions provided 
for the same object. 
As applied to psychological explanation, Fodor's insights are captured 
without recourse to a discussion of functional analysis by views like those of 
Donald Davidson who offers a version of the Contingent Identity Theory of 
Mind which capitalizes on the notion of alternative descriptions of the same 
event. 16 
According to such theories, mental and physical language are treated as 
providing different concepts for the purpose of individuating events. It is 
possible, however, to determine in some cases that the events, states or 
processes described in terms of one vocabulary are contingently identical with 
those described in the other. Nevertheless, it is argued, there may be no 
psychophysical laws or definitions and hence no prospect of reducing mental 
concepts to physical concepts.! 7 
This theory shares a further asset and also a liability with Fodor's 
account. First, it allows us to understand why difficulties arise concerning 
"causal" statements cast in terms of psychological expressions and descrip-
tions of behavior. We fault the statement that the soporific material that a 
man ingested caused him to fall asleep because the generalization of which it 
is an instance is not a genuine causal law. It is not a causal law because of the 
definitional connection between 'soporific power' and 'putting people to 
sleep.' It remains possible, of course, that under another description of the 
material ingested we would have an instance of a genuine causal law. 1 8 A 
similar situation may exist when the connection is conceptual as when the 
terms of a psychological theory are cashed out by means of descriptions of 
behavior. There may be no causal laws connecting psychological states with 
behavior when these states are described in psychological terms, although 
there could be such laws when these states are given alternative descriptions 
in a neurophysical vocabulary. 
Second, Fodor is candid about the difficulties that arise when we try to 
determine functional equivalence. They spring from problems about the 
concept of having consequences that are the same in relevant respects. These 
are some of the same difficulties that arise when we try to spell out 
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conditions for individuating events, since events under descriptions are 
distinguished in part by having the same or different causes and effects Or 
consequences. 
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